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The International Court of Justice-United
States v. Iran
On 24 May 1980, the International Court of Justice delivered its
judgment in United States v. Iran.' The Court unanimously decided that:
[T]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately
take all steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4
November 1979 and what followed from these events and to that end:
(a) must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the
United States Charg6 d'affaires and other United States nationals
now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and
every one and entrust them to the protecting Power;
(b) must ensure that all the said persons have the necessary means
of leaving the Iranian territory including means of transport;
(c) must immediately place in the hands of the protecting Power the
premises, property, archives and documents of the United States Em2
bassy and of its Consulates in Iran ....

The Court also held unanimously "that no member of the United States
diplomatic or consular Staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any
form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness." 8 Although the decision is important in many respects,4 the Court's discussion
of its jurisdiction to issue interim measures despite the concurrent forma-

tion of the United Nations Security Council's Peacekeeping Commission
may be most significant in determining the future role of the Court in the
resolution of political disputes.5

The United States referred the issues raised by the occupation of the
Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic staff to the United Nations
Security Council on 9 November 1979 and to the Secretary-General on 25
November 1979.1 Four days later, while the matter was still before the
Security Council, the United States submitted its application to the

1. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran, [1980] I.C.J.
reprinted in U.N. Doc. S/13989 (1980).
2. U.N. Doc. S/13989 39.
3. Id. at 1 95.4. On 15 December 1979, the Court ordered the release of all American
nationals detained in Iran and the relinquishment of the Embassy to the United States. It
has been suggested that such a decision by the Court clouded the real legal question:
whether the order to release the hostage Americans is an appropriate provisional measure
since if Iran obeyed the order, it would not be able to press its claim that the diplomatic
personnel must stand trial for espionage. See 21 HLv.INT'L L.J. 268, 274 (1980).
4. Stephen Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser in the State Department, has commented
that the decision may help to resuscitate the Court: "We hope this case could contribute to
a renaissance .... The court is in danger of atrophying." NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1979, at 83.
5. During the 35 years of its existence, the Court has only considered 45 disputes and
has issued 14 final judgments, plus 16 advisory opinions. Id.
6. U.N. Doc. S/13989 39.
-;
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Court along with its request for interim measures. 7 On 4 December, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 457 whereby it resolved to "remain
actively seized of the matter." Although the Secretary-General did not
announce the creation of a special Peacekeeping Commission until 7 February 1980, it was apparent in December when the Court issued its indication of provisional measuresO that the Security Council was endeavoring
to resolve the dispute. Regarding the potential of conflict between actions

by the Security Council and those of the International Court of Justice, a
unanimous Court rejected the notion of judicial abstention:
[I~t does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council
that there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the Court and the Security
Council. Nor is there in this any cause for surprise. Whereas Article
12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any
recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect to that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court
by any provision of either the Charter or the Statute of the Court.
The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in
issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal
questions by the Court may be an important and sometimes decisive
factor in prompting the peaceful settlement of the dispute.10

The Court decided by a majority that Iran had violated and continued to violate several bilateral treaties in force between the United States
and Iran"' as well as several principles of diplomacy created by long-established rules of general international law.12 Iran's conduct, it said, could
not be justified even were the alleged criminal activities of the United
States in Iran proven, 8 "because diplomatic law itself provides the neces-

7. Id. The Court granted the request by the United States for relief pendente lite on 15
December 1979. United States v. Iran, [1979] I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 931,
959-60 (1979).
8.U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 39.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. U.N. Doc. 8/13989 at 40. The Court cited Article 36 of the U.N. Charter and the
Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf Case, [1979] I.C.J. 12, for the proposition that neither the
mandate given by the Security Council for the formation of a commission by the SecretaryGeneral can be considered an obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. U.N. Doc.
S/13989 at 1 40.
11. Id. at 95. Of primary importance is the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
12. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, was intended to codify the principle of customary international law of the personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. See Commentary of 1958
Draft Article 27, [1958] 11 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 97. This principle is the oldest, most fundamental principle of diplomatic law. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DELOmATc RELATIONS 135 (1976). See also SATOW's GUIDE TO DIPLOmATIc PRAcTIce 120 (5th ed. L. Gore-Booth 1979).
13. U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 1 37. A perfunctory challenge to jurisdiction was raised by
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sary means of defense against, and sanction for illicit activities by members of diplomatic or consular missions.""' Specifically, the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express sanctions for situations where
members of an embassy engage in espionage under the guise of diplomatic immunity: the receiving state may either declare such "diplomats"
to be persona non grata or break diplomatic relations with the sending
state."6
Consequences for the future

The International Court of Justice has suggested a construct for the
peaceful settlement of political disputes which is rooted in the belief that
the resolution of a legal issue sometimes hastens the resolution of a politi-

cal dispute. One might ask why, if this is true, the Court's decision had no
effect on the Government of Iran. Although the principle of diplomatic
and consular immunity is a fundamental precept of international law,1'

the Government of Iran has eschewed every indication that such concepts
are valid or applicable to a revolutionary regime. This viewpoint is aptly

expressed in two interviews given by the Ayatollahs Behesti and
Khomeini a few weeks after the initial hostage-taking. In the first,
Behesti-a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Council-attempted to
justify the action of 4 November by arguing that traditional, nonrevolutionary principles do not apply to revolutionary regimes.' 7 In the second,

Iran in a letter of 9 December 1979 which argued that the American appeal could not be
examined by the Court separately from what it described as the "overall problem" involving
"more than twenty-five years of continual interference by the United States in the internal
affairs of Iran." The Court answered this charge with an opinion which might indicate a
shift toward favoring intensified judicial activity, especially in time of strife:
[NIever has the view been put forward before that because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should
decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them. Nor
can any basis for such a view of the Court's function be found in the Charter or
the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted
restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international
disputes.
Id.
14. Id. at T 83.
15. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
16. The tradition of Islam has made a substantial contribution to the evolution of this
concept. U.N. Doc. S/13989 at 1 86.
17. The Ayatollah Behesti was interviewed by the German newsmagazine Die Stern:
[Stern] If spies are discovered in a foreign embassy, it is a standard procedure
to expel them, but not to take them as hostages.
[Behesti] It is a standard procedure? If we were talking here about diplomatic
relations, I would say you are right. But we have a revolution and they have
laws of their own. Being revolutionaries we support the youth because this action is the only way to make the world familiar with their ideas, goals and
feelings of revenge. The world must understand that.
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Khomeini was asked:
[Question] [You are holding the hostages of the American Embassy
in Tehran ....

Would you release the hostages?

[Khomeini] Do international conventions provide for the sending of
spies into a country in the name of an ambassador or a charg6
d'affaires or not? . .. What our nation has done is to arrest a bunch
of spies who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried and
treated in accordance with our own laws.' 8

Although no suggestion has been made by Iran that the Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of 195519 between the
United States and Iran was not in force on 4 November 1979 when the
American Embassy was overrun or on 29 November when the United
States submitted its dispute to the Court, Iran reasons that any treaties
or conventions that were in force with the Pahlavi regime are not applicable to the new revolutionary government. This doctrine of convenience is
clearly at odds with even the basest understanding of the concept of re0
bus sic stantibus.2
Notwithstanding the celerity and decisiveness with
which it acted, and the fact that the Court can at times be effective, 2 this
decision is especially troubling because its ineffectiveness in a case involving a clear breach of a fundamental precept of international law might
well encourage a proliferation of Iran's doctrine of convenience.
Brian J. McCoy

[Stern] What does the Koran have to say of. this primitive way of revenge
thinking?
[Behestil It allows it but also says forgiving is better ....
Memorial for the Petitioner, United States v. Iran, [1980] I.C.J. _; reprinted in U.N. Doc.
8/13989 at 128-29.
18. Memorial for Petitioner, at 215, United States v. Iran, [19801 I.C.J.
; reprinted
in U.N. Doc. S/13989. In answer to the question posed by Khomeini:
The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express provisions to meet
the case when members of an embassy staff, under the cover of diplomatic
privileges and immunities engage in such abuses of their functions as espionage ....
[Ilt is for the very purpose of providing a remedy for such possible
abuses of diplomatic functions that Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates:
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain
its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any
member of the diplomatic staff is persona non grata or that any other
member of the staff is not acceptable. In any such case the sending
State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his function with the mission ....
19. Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
20. The majority of modern writers accept the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which
invokes a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating a treaty. See I.
BRowNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 617 (3d. ed. 1979); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, reprintedin 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 679 (1969); but
cf. J. BRwALY, THE LAw OF NATONS 335-39 (6th. ed. H. Waldock 1963).
21. See E. McWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw-MAKING PROCaSS 17-97 (1979). McWhinney discusses what he terms the "judicial activ-

ism" of the Court.

